That does, of course, leave the question of whether coalition or a minority Tory government would be preferable. A minority Tory government, with Liberal Democrats providing support on “confidence and supply”, certainly sounds tempting to some in the party. (Though given that the “supply” part of the phrase is voting with a minority government on the big financial votes, it’s worth remembering that would have meant voting for George Osborne’s financial measures.)

But what do the voters think?

Courtesy of polling carried out last Thursday and Friday by YouGov we have some pretty up to date evidence (with all the usual caveats about one poll etc, but as you’ll see the margins are pretty hefty).

The poll shows that current Liberal Democrat voters think the party should stay in coalition, but express its differences with the Tories more often (with my bolding in the questions):

Do you believe the Liberal Democrats should now distance themselves from the Tories?
No, they should remain in the coalition and continue to make the compromises necessary for the coalition to work: 36%
Yes, they should remain in the coalition but refuse to back policies they oppose: 48%
Yes, they should leave the coalition altogether: 9%

Less than one in ten Lib Dem voters saying the party should leave the coalition is a clear message. But, you may ask, that’s current Lib Dem voters – what about those who used to be Liberal Democrats? That’s a fair question as the YouGov poll put the party on 10%.

However, the poll also records results from people who were recorded by YouGov last May as having voted Lib Dem, both those who are still Lib Dem and those who are no longer Lib Dem. Their views collectively are not that different:

Do you believe the Liberal Democrats should now distance themselves from the Tories?
No, they should remain in the coalition and continue to make the compromises necessary for the coalition to work: 23%
Yes, they should remain in the coalition but refuse to back policies they oppose: 48%
Yes, they should leave the coalition altogether: 21%

So when you look at the views of people who voted Liberal Democrat last May, 71% still think the party should remain in coalition. The idea that leaving the coalition would somehow win back the support lost since last year isn’t supported by this evidence. In amongst the 21% are certainly some very vocal voices, but they are the 21% not the 71%.

What the figures show is that many Liberal Democrats – both currently and the 2010 voters – want the party to distance itself from the Tories, but by a massive majority wants to stay in the coalition.

A post from me…

Is the world speeding up? No, it’s slowing down

Faster, faster, faster: that is the classic mantra of many a presentation about the way social media, technology and indeed the world is changing. And my idea? That if you look closely at the evidence, the world is actually slowing down, not speeding up.

Read the real story of how the world is slowing down in my full post.

… and a post from someone else

Re-visiting Tuition Fees: Peter Mandelson’s Helpful Intervention

Nick Thornsby points out that Peter Mandelson, a man who should know, was expecting Labour to double tuition fees if they had won the 2010 general election. For Mandelson says in his memoirs,

I felt that they would certainly have to double in order to offset the deficit-reduction measures that we too would have implemented had we won the election.

Read the full post from Nick Thornsby here.

Although only briefly mentioned by Laws himself, perhaps the most important is how much the Liberal Democrats owe to Chris Huhne. In April, just before the second TV debate, I wrote,

It’s worth taking a moment to reflect on one of the reasons why Nick Clegg did so well in the first debate and also why the party was poised in a happy and strong position such that Nick’s debate victory boosted the party

Not only did Chris Huhne play the role of Gordon Brown in the debate preparations, but the very fact that a closely defeated leadership candidate was used in such a role reflects on how closely and how well Nick and Chris now work together.

Their leadership contest was tetchy at times and finished a nail bitter. Some predicted the outcome would doom the party to splits and further trauma, but Chris has played his role perfectly.

Laws’s book brings out into the public Huhne’s close involvement in shaping the party’s approach to a hung Parliament and how he persuaded many others of the virtues of coalition over confidence and supply. The environment in which that was done was one of mutual respect and debate – a sharp contrast from the Labour Party where so much of their approach to the hung Parliament was shaped by former and future personal ambitions.

In Laws’s account, the final outcome of the coalition talks between the three main parties was pretty much determined by the result the voters decided on (wittingly or not) in the general election. There are no “what if…” moments from the post-result events which can spur alternative histories except for one – perhaps it might have been no AV referendum and confidence and supply rather than coalition. But it would still have been Cameron as Prime Minister, and Laws’s book does not suggest any plausible sequence by which that could have turned out differently.

Laws emphasises the strong Liberal Democrat desire to avoid a second general election in 2010 because of the strong (and rich) position the Conservatives would be in but above all because a  period of instability after May 2010 could have wrecked havoc on the financial markets and would have been the worst possible advertisement for electoral reform in the future. As it is, the sort of anti-hung Parliament arguments that the Conservatives used before polling day are now impossible for them to make in future with a straight face.

The book has a few barbs at others, though they are generally good humoured or discrete, as in the lack of naming names when Laws says of Clegg that, “refreshingly for a Lib Dem leader he did not spend all his time obsessing” about hung Parliament scenarios in advance of the election.

The one exception is Gordon Brown who, in every political book I have read that has come out since May, gets a heavy pasting regardless of the political loyalties of the author. As Laws recounts saying to Clegg when discussing hung Parliaments in advance of May, “If his own Cabinet colleagues cannot work with him, what chance do four or five Lib Dem ministers have?”

One nugget about Brown’s views that Laws does reveal is that in the post-election negotiations, Brown expressed a willingness to speed up the pace of deficit reduction. Another nugget about Labour’s rather dysfunctional approach to handling a hung Parliament is the quote from Peter Mandelson who, on opening formal talks with the Liberal Democrats, added that, “Of course, Alistair Darling will have views on all of this … We do not presume to know Alistair’s views”. A rather more conventional approach to negotiations would have seen the lead negotiators knowing their own Chancellor’s views before entering the room.

Aside from Brown and Labour’s approach to negotiating, some of the sharpest comments are directed at Liberal Democrat habits or outlooks, as in the description of the party’s manifesto policy to scrap tuition fees as a “comfort blanket” and an electoral “gimmick”.

More good humoured are Laws’s accounts of Paddy Ashdown, who comes through in the book as having played a central role as an advisor to Nick Clegg and others and who hasn’t changed his habits: “I switched off my phone only to be woken half an hour later by Paddy who, having failed to get through on my mobile, had managed to track down my pager number instead. I cannot remember what he said to me at 3:15am, but I have the distinct recollection of thinking that it could have waited until a more civilised hour.”

Laws’s book offers some insights into his own political views, particularly how his liberalism differs from Conservatism. Interestingly he concurs with the views of David Howarth, the former Liberal Democrat MP and a man usually seen as being from a different political tradition within the Liberal Democrats than David Laws. In Reinventing the State, Howarth argued that social and economic liberals agree on objectives, but differed on the best means to achieve them. Laws here agrees, describing the Orange Book as seeking “to explain how ‘social liberal’ ends could be delivered by ‘economically liberal’ means”.

Overall the book is an easily digestible quick read, with enough new little anecdotes to keep it interesting even for a reader already familiar with the events. It is also good to see David Laws do what some, but not enough, politicians do in their accounts of events – he remembers the contribution of staff and volunteers (both in his constituency and in the party centrally), naming, praising and thanking many.

You can buy 22 Days in May by David Laws from Amazon and see also Helen’s interview with David Laws about the book.

Mandelson is also, alongside Peter Watt and Deborah Mattinson, part of another trio – Labour insiders who have recently published their account of life in New Labour. They all scatter some compliments about Brown through their books, but the overall picture painted of Gordon Brown is a deeply unflattering one. It’s a picture of a once talented politician and strategic thinker who spent over a decade in a sulk at not becoming Labour leader, frequently indulging in highly partisan infighting and repeatedly pushing to one side policy priorities as so many at the top of Labour were consumed with trying to keep the Blair-Brown show from completely imploding. As Mandelson records it, even Gordon Brown (speaking to him in 2008) admitted,

‘It was all so wretched between us all – you, me, Tony. It was so wasteful! We could have achieved so much more. We still did a lot, though. Perhaps surprisingly.’

‘I agree,’ I replied. ‘What on earth were we doing? We doubted each other. We read everything into each other’s motives and actions.’

He was right, I said. ‘You say everything we did through the prism of “We want to destroy you.” We say everything you did through the prism of “You want Tony out.” It was a sort of mutually assured destruction’.

The picture of a Labour Party deeply split and distracted by this personality politics is not new, and was previously painted by journalists such as Andrew Rawnsley and James Naughtie. Mandelson adds some vivid colour, as when Blair said that Brown required “massive therapy” to get over not being leader or when Fiona Miller writes that, “I’d be disgusted if my children behaved the way [Brown] does”. One attempt to patch up the Brown-Blair disputes even resulted in a remarkable agreement to set up a “hotline system”; as Mandelson says this “sounded more like an arms pact” than an agreement between the two most senior figures in a political party.

What is new is the blame being placed almost completely on Brown through the accounts of him given in all three books. Mandelson’s version gives some indication of how future pro-Brown accounts may look to repair this damage to his Gordon Brown’s reputation. Did Brown repudiate Blair’s ideas to reform public services because they were Blair’s policies or because they weren’t properly thought out and weren’t Labour enough? The former clearly played a significant role, but perhaps future accounts will look to stress the latter rather more. In the meantime, it is Brown’s reputation – and so indirectly that too of his keenest supporters – which takes a battering.

Mandelson offers some insights into why Brown failed as Prime Minister, suggesting that the mode of working which suited him well at the Treasury was disastrously ill-suited to 10 Downing Street. As Chancellor Brown had a very fluid diary, his own attention darting back and forth between issues, but within the constrains that he only concentrated on a relatively small number of big events during the year, such as the Budget. A Prime Minister cannot similarly keep the number of big issues passing over their desk to such a small number and that much heavier flow, combined with the continuing frequent changing of diaries and flitting of attention made for a hopelessly slow, cumbersome and indecisive decision-making process. Issues came, went and came back again with added levels of micro-management in lieu of clear strategic decision making.

Arguments over Brown are matters for history now. Mattering rather more for the immediate future of the Labour Party is how the reputation of its leadership candidates emerge. Ed Balls’s role at the centre of Brown’s infighting cabal is already well known. What Mandelson’s book also emphasises (and coming from someone who has made a career out of having to choose words carefully, it is hard to believe this is accidental) is how central Ed Miliband also was to the Brown and Balls set-up.

Even back in 1997 Gordon Brown was running his own parallel election campaign structure, with Ed Miliband one of the key players in this private unauthorised operation that dogged the footsteps of the party’s official campaign under Blair ordered that it ceased.

By contrast, his brother David gets a generally complimentary write-up, with Mandelson often praising his skills and giving an account of events that places David Miliband’s decisions not to challenge Brown as the end results of careful and reasonable thought rather than as the result of a lack of courage at the big moments.

Mandleson’s account contains a series of rebuttals of hostile accounts others have given of his actions at various times in his career, with Alistair Campbell being painted as ill-informed and blundering in this book’s account of Mandelson’s second resignation as a result of the Hinduja passport affair.

Peter Mandelson is not without criticism of his own actions, though they are in the general without specific examples conceded save in the case of his first resignation where he admits to at least a significant lapse of his political judgement in not seeing a problem with taking a loan from Geoffrey Robinson.

The most interesting, and hardest to judge, parts of the book are Mandelson’s account of what went on inside his own head. In the end no-one else can known for sure how true or accurate his account of his inner psychology is. There are some touches of inconsistency with other people’s accounts and between Mandelson’s own words which act as a reminder that the book is not just about what Mandelson did in the past but how he will be remembered in the future. One such inconsistency even occurs within the book where Mandelson both plays down his role in ensuring Gordon Brown was not ousted following James Purnell’s 2009 resignation and yet also later describes how he went into “overdrive” at that time. An overdrive of languidly calling people who weren’t really unhappy at all isn’t quite what he means I suspect, with that second version being rather closer to the truth.

Despite these doubts it makes for an at time fascinating account of the psychological pressures on those at the top in politics and the degree to which events are about how personalities cope with pressures rather than about simple academic weighing of policy options. As Mandelson summarises his own view of politics, and seeks to explain his hostility yet loyalty to Brown, “Perhaps it is a fault to cling too dogmatically to an idea or a policy, but not, in my view, to a person to whom you have made a commitment”.

The degree to which New Labour did not stick dogmatically to previous ideas is demonstrated by Mandelson’s account of when he first was impressed by Tony Blair in the 1980s. It was an appearance on Question Time – where Blair laid into the Conservatives for undermining civil liberties. By the end of his time as Prime Minister, Blair had so comprehensively gone much, much further on civil liberties that the Conservatives were left the liberal defenders of civil liberties to Labour’s right-wing authoritarianism.

The origin of Brown’s reputation is also laced with historic irony, as Mandelson accounts on the following page. Brown’s stand-in role responding to the government’s autumn financial statement in 1988 was a virtuoso display of political rhetoric laying into a Conservative government which, he said, had overseen irresponsible levels of borrowing and only superficial economic success for it was “a boom based on credit”. The same speech that made Brown’s national reputation could also act as its epitaph.

As for Mandelson’s own political future, he has been such a colourful and influential character that it holds a general interest across politics. More specifically, for the Liberal Democrats he presents himself in the book as in favour of the Alternative Vote, generally welcoming the idea of Lib-Lab cooperation and even the man who prompted Gordon Brown to drop the childish/lazy (delete to choice) use of “Liberal” and to start using “Liberal Democrat” if he was serious about wanting to strike a deal with the party. Those attitudes could yet turn out to be important to the future of British politics.

You can buy Peter Mandelson’s The Third Man: Life at the heart of New Labour from Amazon.

Amid reported wrangling between No 10 and the Treasury, Lord Mandelson suggested in his memoir that Mr Brown rejected a proposal from the chancellor to raise VAT while Mr Darling quashed calls for any future VAT rises to be ruled out. (BBC)

Mandelson writes that Brown and Darling rowed over economic strategy. He “vetoed point-blank” a proposal from Darling to raise VAT up to 18% or 19%. The then chancellor then blocked a proposal from Brown to rule out VAT rises under Labour in the course of that parliament. (Guardian)

Perhaps we’ll see a sudden point of principle discovered by some in Labour which makes VAT at 19% acceptable but VAT at 20% beyond the pale…!

Step forward and take a bow: the Labour Party (front bench voted for the Digital Economy Bill)

Followed by a bow please from the Conservative Party (front bench voted for the Digital Economy Bill)

For as The Frontline reports:

Despite months promoting the rights of copyright holders with its Digital Economy Bill, the government has caused something of a furore after revelations that its recently crowdsourced campaign poster has breached copyright laws.

The poster is intended to parody Tory leader David Cameron by placing his head on an image of Ashes to Ashes cop DCI Gene Hunt sitting atop his Audi Quattro.

However, the image was not free-to-use but in fact owned by production company Kudos which produces the show for the BBC, and as such subject to strict copyright laws.

The Tories also broke the copyright on the image by repurposing it with the slogan: “Fire up the Quattro, it’s time for a change”…

Labour’s leadership team of Lord Mandelson, Douglas Alexander and Harriet Harman had taken responsibility for OK’ing the poster.

All of which means, in a rather satisfying twist, that Mandelson, the ’subservient plaything’ of Hollywood lobbyists and architect of the Digital Economy Bill, has himself been implicated in a spot of copyright infringement.

In the immortal words of DCI Hunt, “You’re nicked, sunshine”.

If the issue is so important that legislation has to be rushed through Parliament without proper debate, you know perhaps it’s also important enough to follow the law yourself?

Watch the interview here.

And no sniggering at the back when the Prime Minister pauses during his first answer.

(More also on this interview in a Channel 4 News report.)

2 Must-Read Blog Posts

What are other Liberal Democrat bloggers saying? Here are two posts that have caught the eye from the Liberal Democrat Blogs aggregator:

• The Mood at Lib Dem Conference: Nick Thornsby takes the pulse
• The Saturday List: Lib Dem Constituency Songs: Will Howells does politics. Will Howells does music. This time he does politics and music at the same time.

Spotted any other great posts in the last day from blogs that aren’t on the aggregator? Do post up a comment sharing them with us all.

2 Big Stories

Sarkozy faces heavy loss in French regional poll

Reuters reports:

French President Nicolas Sarkozy faces a regional vote on Sunday that opinion polls suggest will result in a heavy loss for his center-right UMP party in the last ballot box test before he comes up for re-election in 2012.

Unemployment in France is running at more than 10 percent, public finances are under growing strain and a series of controversies over issues ranging from lavish executive pay to immigration and security have undermined Sarkozy’s popularity.

“Rarely has a regional election been so national,” the leftwing daily Liberation declared in an editorial on Saturday. “The last vote before the presidential election in 2012. It can change the political landscape.”

Sarkozy has said the election will be about local issues and he has ruled out a major reshuffle if the results are as bad as expected, but he said last week that he would be “attentive” to what voters say and some cabinet changes are possible.

Vote Lib-Dem – Mandelson

The Western Morning News reports:

LORD Mandelson has made a direct appeal to non-Tory voters in the Westcountry to support the Liberal Democrats in a bid to hold back a Conservative landslide in the region.

The Business Secretary and key architect of Labour election strategy told the Western Morning News that the Lib-Dems “have more in common with Labour than with any other party”.

Sunday Bonus

It’s a blog. It’s about bollards. It has photos of bollards. Including a particular fine rising bollard. Go read it. NOW.

Ms Pratt added: “Over recent months we have had several inquiries from staff within Gordon Brown’s office.

“Some have downloaded information; some have actually called our helpline directly and I have spoken to staff in his office.”

My view anyway was that she shouldn’t have spoken out – and certainly not said she saw something on TV, was angered by it and so picked up the phone to the media. That’s what callers to phone-in programmes do. The head of a charity dealing with such sensitive and confidential issues shouldn’t just leap into action publicising information because they’ve just been angered by what they’ve seen on the TV.

Particularly when what she’s now saying people have contacted her about doesn’t actually seem to contradict the claim from Peter Mandelson which she says so angered her.

But look closely at what she said: “Some have downloaded information”.

How does she know this? You’d expect people from Downing Street to have visited her site and others when researching bullying. Gordon Brown has given government support to anti-bullying initiatives in the past and where do you think his staff would have gone for their research? To the internet and to anti-bullying websites of course.

So how does she know that people downloading this information were really people concerned about being bullied themselves?

Given all the words of journalists being spilled over the story at the moment I’m a bit surprised no-one seems to have put this question to her. It’ll be interesting to see what her answer is if or when it is.

Second, though, it also takes an extremely old-fashioned and rigid attitude. It’s one of saying “stop the world, then throw it into reverse as that’s the only thing we can do”. The reality is that one of the most effective – and tried and tested – ways of tackling illegal file-sharing is to make legal file-sharing easier and more widely available.

The book and journal publishing industry faced a similar challenge in the past as photocopiers spread. Photocopiers were increasingly used to make illegal copies of publications – with all the usual arguments that flow from that. But rather than demanding that the state sent round photocopier inspectors to unplug photocopiers that might have been used for an illegal copy, the industry ended up with more more sensible and durable solution: sell bulk licenses for the right to use a photocopier to reproduce copyrighted material. Of course not everyone follows the license as they should, but the licenses produce a significant income from the large and ready market of people (and, in this case, in particularly libraries) who want to be legal and will be legal – if you make it practical to be so.

In the case of the music industry we’ve seen similar block licensing for other medium – it’s how radio stations can practically broadcast large numbers of different songs. Having to individually negotiate the rights to each song would be impractical. The result? More playing of songs, more direct money for the music industry – and more indirect revenues too as each playing of a song acts as a free advertisement.

However, in the online world such bulk licenses are still rare with the music industry dragging its feet in many negotiation sessions. Peter Mandelson, judging by what he’s proposed in the Digital Economy Bill, is happy with this hostility to bulk licensing. But for constitency, perhaps he should not also add in proposals to demand a three strikes and your toner is impounded policy on photocopying…